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This paper estimates the costs of buying water use rights from farmers located in the Mafraq-
Azraq basin in Jordan. Farmers’ water supply curve is estimated using data gathered from a 
contingent valuation survey. Estimation results indicate that a total supply of 29 million m
3 could 
be periodically purchased from farmers at an annual price of approximately JD 0.23/m
3 (1 JD ≈ 
0.70 U.S. dollars), or a total cost of about JD 6.8 million per year.  
 











Potential for Tradable Water Allocation and Rights in Jordan 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) (2009), the problem of water 
scarcity on the planet is getting worse as cities and populations grow, and the demand for water 
increases in agriculture, industry and households. One of the regions most heavily affected by 
this problem is the dry Middle East. Most countries in the region are projected to be in a state of 
absolute water scarcity by 2025 which indicates that their annual water resources will not be 
sufficient to meet reasonable per capita water needs for their growing populations (Seckler, 
Molden and Barker, 1999).  
Among the Middle Eastern countries, Jordan is one of the poorest in terms of its available 
water resources for domestic needs and food production (Salameh, 2000).  Jordan’s population-
water resources equation for 2002 indicates that it is grossly out of balance, possessing about 306 
m
3/capita compared to 1,700 m
3/capita needed to satisfy its municipal, industrial and agricultural 
needs (Haddadin, Salman and Karablieh, 2006). Moreover, it is estimated that by 2020 the per 
capita share of fresh water potential available for all purposes will fall to only 127 m
3/capita 
(Salman et al., 2006).  
In 2005, the total supply of water in Jordan was 941 Mm
3 (Million m
3) coming primarily 
of surface water (251 Mm
3) and groundwater (496 Mm
3), with treated waste water being used on 
an increasing scale for irrigation (83 Mm
3). Accounting for all planned sustainable and non-
sustainable sources of water over the next 15 years, it is projected that 1093 Mm
3 of total water 
will be available in 2020. However, the projected allocations to industry and municipalities are 
118 Mm
3 less that their projected requirements.  
 Given the priority of households’ basic water needs and the significant economic return 
from industry per cubic meter of water used, it is likely that the available water supply will be 
provided to these sectors first (Mohsen, 2007; USAID, 2007). However, little policy analysis has 4 
 
been conducted to date addressing the costs and benefits of transferring water from the 
agricultural sector to the industrial and domestic sectors.  Most of the previous literature related 
to water use in the agricultural sector in Jordan has focused on water allocation within the sector 
toward higher valued crops or to increase the efficiency of irrigation water use (Doppler et al., 
2002; Ramirez and Frank, 2010). 
 The Mafraq-Azraq aquifer accounts for a significant portion of the underground water 
resources available to Jordan (Bajjali and Al-Haddi, 2006). At present, most of the water 
extracted from the aquifer is devoted to irrigation through pumping previously sanctioned by the 
government. While the government has legal authority to rescind some or all of those pumping 
permits, farmers view them as long-term water rights. Because the aquifer is close to Amman, 
home to more than half of the country's population and two thirds of its economic activity, a 
major policy objective in regard to the Mafraq-Azraq basin is to examine the economic 
feasibility of water transfers from irrigation to urban water use to support Amman’s growth. An 
important part of this objective is to minimize economic impacts on farmers and the overall 
welfare of this region's inhabitants (Doppler et al., 2002). Therefore, the objectives of this paper 
are first to estimate the costs of buying water use rights from farmers located in the Mafraq-
Azraq basin, and second to identify the factors driving farmers’ willingness to accept value to 
sell their water use rights. Assessing the value of that water to the agricultural sector will allow 
the government to fairly compensate farmers and ensure that rural communities are not 
economically damaged by an eventual water transfer. The results of this study will enable 
Jordanian policy makers to make more informed decisions on how to best meet future urban 
water demands in the country without hindering the economic welfare of agricultural producers 
and other rural inhabitants.   5 
 
The first objective is accomplished by constructing the farmers’ water supply curve. The 
supply curve is estimated using an innovative procedure that combines discrete and open ended 
contingent valuation (CV) questions and nonparametric methods. Previous studies using discrete 
contingent valuation questions and nonparametric procedures have focused on the estimation of 
the population willingness to pay function (WTP) (e.g., Day, 2007; Haab and McConnell, 1997). 
In this paper we show how these procedures can be modified when the primary object of concern 
of the CV study is the estimation of the supply curve using willingness to accept (WTA) data.  
Methods and Procedures 
Theoretical Framework 
To conceptualize water use transfer rights, we consider a model of behavior that assumes that 
farmers who own a well are interested in maximizing their utility from the income earned from 
farming and/or other sources. The solution to this problem yields an indirect utility function  
(1)                                                            V(z,p,y ) 
where z is a vector of measurable personal and farm characteristics and p is a price vector for the 
goods being consumed. The variable y denotes total income, which is assumed to be derived 
from two main sources, farm (π) and off-farm (OFI). A farmer’s willingness to accept (WTA) to 
sell his/her water use rights is implicitly defined as: 
(2)                                 V(z,p,y
0 )=V(z,p,y
1+WTA)      or  
(3)         V(z,p, π
0+OFI)=V(z,p, π
1+OFI+WTA)          
where the superscripts 0 and 1 in y and π
0
 indicate the differences in income resulting from the 







and, therefore, WTA is the minimum amount of money that the farmer is willing to accept in 
compensation for the income reduction.   6 
 
  Farmers’ income from farming (π) can be represented as:  
(4)                           
where   is output price, q is the output quantity ,   is a vector of input costs,   is a vector of 
input quantities,   and τ is the production set. Hence,   
 which implies that  WTA 
should be at least equal to the decrease in net revenue due to the yield reduction caused by the 
loss of access to groundwater for irrigation. Moreover, if production is not possible without 
irrigation, which is the case for most farmers in the Mafraq region, the net revenue reduction 
 equals  . Therefore, the WTA can be expressed as a function of the same factors 
affecting :  
(4)               
  In summary, the results of the theoretical section indicate that farmers WTA for the water 
use rights should be influenced by the same factors that influence farm profitability: output and 
input prices as well as other factors affecting utility and the production function such as a farm 
and farmer characteristics.  
Data 
Data collection for this research took place in summer 2006, through a survey of 105 
farmers in the Mafraq-Azraq basin. The survey sample was stratified by size to make sure that it 
was representative of the population of farmers in that region, which consists of approximately 
300 producers. The survey instrument was administered by a team of three individuals from the 
local area with technical training in agriculture and strong ties with the local communities. 
Expert advice was sought to make sure that the questions were framed in a culturally acceptable 
way that was clear and understandable to the farmers while eliciting reliable responses. Two 
individuals who were also born and raised in Jordan’s rural communities, held graduate degrees 7 
 
in agricultural fields, and had experience designing and conducting farmer surveys in that 
country were responsible to train the survey team and conducted a practice round of five 
interviews with them. The data and observational information gathered through these preliminary 
interviews were evaluated and used to refine the survey instrument and to formulate a culturally 
acceptable method to administer it. The survey contained about 50 questions and took an average 
of two hours to conduct.  
Contingent Valuation Questions  
The contingent valuation questions required to estimate the parameters of the WTA model 
used a dichotomous choice format, where a farmer was asked to identify his choice to accept or 
not to accept to sell their water use rights at a stated price.  Surveyed individuals were initially 
asked if they would accept to sell their water use rights at some initial PI.  If they indicated that 
they were willing to accept the initial bid, they were subsequently asked if they would be willing 
to accept a lower bid (PSL). Alternatively, if farmers were not willing to accept the initial bid, a 
higher bid (PSH) was offered to them.   
The four possible responses to the bid scenarios are (1) a “yes” to both bids, (2), a “no” 
followed by a “yes”, (3) a “yes” followed by a “no”, and (4) “no” to both bids. The sequence of 
questions defines the following ranges for the true WTA values: (0,PSL], (PI,PSH], (PSL,PI],  and 
(PSH, ∞).  The following four discrete outcomes of the bidding process are observable: 
(5)        
  The initial bids (PI’s) used in the survey included 0.067JD/m3, 0.133JD/m3 and 
0.200JD/m3 (1JD 1.5$US). Lower and higher subsequent bids were calculated subtracting or 8 
 
adding 0.033JD to the initial bids. In addition to the four outcomes shown in (5), all the farmers 
that answer “no” to both bids voluntarily provided their minimum willingness to accept value in 
an open ended format. As we will discuss in the next section, this information proves useful for 
modeling purposes. We believe that since the open ended answers were willingly provided by 
the survey respondents who are used to the practice of bargaining still prevalent in the region, the 
procedure is less likely to suffer from the criticisms mentioned by the NOAA panel (Arrow et al., 
1993) when individuals are asked directly their WTP or WTA:  1) lack of realism since the 
procedure is not commonplace in a person daily routine, and 2) incentive to overestimate the 
WTA or WTP values.   
Econometric Models  
WTA model  
  Estimation of the parameters of the WTA model was carried out using the nonparametric 
approach for interval-censored data proposed in Turnbull (1976). This estimation technique does 
not impose ad hoc assumptions on the distribution of WTA, F(WTA). Denoting the lower bounds 
of the intervals in (10) as   and the upper bounds as   the probability of observing an 
individual i from this population indicating that his WTA lays in the interval between   and   
is given by (Day, 2007; Turnbull, 1976):  
(6)      
The probability of observing a particular set of responses in a random sample of N 
individuals from the population of interest is given by the likelihood function: 
(7)            9 
 
    In a contingent valuation survey, the bid amounts used in the dichotomous questions are 
specified by the researcher. Assuming that WTA is non-negative, each of the pre-specified bid 
amounts can be denoted such that:  
(8)                         . 
The amounts in the bid design also form a series of m intervals of the form 
( , which are usually referred to as basic intervals to differentiate them 
from the individuals’ WTA intervals defined in (5).   In order to express the likelihood function in 
terms of the basic intervals we define an indicator variable   which indicates whether an 
individual’s WTA interval includes the   basic interval.  
(9)        
  Using this indicator variable, the likelihood function corresponding to (7), and 
simplifying notation such that   the resulting log-likelihood function is:  
(10)        ln   
  Given that the probability distribution of the WTA, F(WTA) is unknown, Turnbulls’ 
procedure considers each Fm as a parameter to be estimated. Moreover, in order to ensure that the 
estimates of the likelihood define a valid cumulative distribution function, the problem needs to 
be expressed as a constrained maximization problem of the form:  
(11)          
        Subject to:   
 10 
 
      Since (11) is strictly concave, the Fm estimates of are unique. Estimation can be 
then carried out using Turnbull’s self-consistent algorithm (Day, 2007; Gomez, Calle and Oller, 
2004; Turnbull, 1976).  
Supply of Water from Agricultural Uses   
In contrast to traditional contingent valuation studies in the environmental economics 
literature where the main outcome of interest is the population mean willingness to pay (WTP) 
value, the construction of the supply curve requires estimates of the individuals’ WTA values 
(e.g., Haab and McConnell, 1997; Dorfman et al., 2008). In this section we outline a procedure 
which allows estimation of farmers’ unobservable WTA amounts using the estimated   
parameters. First notice that an estimate of the probability that the WTA of farmer i is in the basic 
bid interval m conditional on belonging to the WTA interval 
is given by (Day, 2007; Fay and Shih, 
1998):  
(12)              
  The expected WTA can be written as (Carlson et al., 1994; Haab and McConnell, 1997):  
 (13)                   .  
  Replacing WTA by the lower or upper bound of each interval, it can be shown that the 
lower (LB) and upper bound (UB) estimates of the expected E(WTA) are:  
(14)         11 
 
(15)            . 
Therefore, lower and upper bound estimates willingness to pay for farmer i are:
1   
(16)             . 
(17)             . 
    Since the calculation of the upper bounds in (15) and (17), require an estimate of 
, this value was estimated using the willingness to accept values provided by those farmers’ 
that answered “no” to both bids. As shown in Cooke (1979), an estimate of the upper bound of a 
random variable is given by   where   and   are the nth and nth-1 order statistics 
based on the original sample. Hence, the highest two WTA values provided by the group of 
farmers in response outcome 4 (equation 5) were used for the calculations.  
Supply Curve Estimation  
A supply curve can be created using a function   such that (Dorfman et al., 2008): 
(18)            
  where     is given by (14) or (15), and op is the offered price. Then the supply curve can be 
written as: 
(19)         , 
                                                           
1Even though we refer to these estimates as the farmers’ i WTA values, they represent the WTA values for all the 
individuals sharing the same initial bid value and the responses to that and the subsequent bid (i.e., individuals 
sharing the same set of dim and δim values). Hence, the resulting supply curve is a step function.  12 
 
where    is the amount of water currently used by farmer i, and s is the  inverse of the 
proportion of farmers in the population being represented by each sampled individual.  
Conservative and liberal estimates of the water supply curve  can be calculated by using 
the WTA estimates presented in (14) and (15), respectively.  
Determinants of WTA  
 In order to analyze the effect of several economic variables and farm and farmer characteristics 
on farmers’ WTA value we assumed the following WTA function: 
(20)           
where X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a conformable vector of coefficients and u is a 
random variable accounting for unobservable characteristics. By using equation (18) and 
assuming that  , where H is a cumulative distribution function with mean zero and 
variance 
2, then the choice probabilities corresponding to expression (5) are: 
(20.1)         
(20.2)         
(20.3)       
 (20.4)        




where Dj indicates the group of individuals belonging to the jth bidding process outcome. Given 
a choice for the cumulative distribution function H, the parameters  and 
2 can be estimated.  
Notice that in contrast to supply estimation where nonparametric methods were used, parametric 
procedures are applied in this case since, to the best of our knowledge, nonparametric regression 
models for interval censored data are not available and semi-parametric methods are only 
recently being developed (Gomez, Calle and Oller, 2004; Yu and Wong, 2003). The approach 
outlined in equation (20) is an adaptation of the censored regression procedure for the estimation 
based on “closed-ended” contingent valuation survey data proposed by Cameron and James 
(1987) and Cameron (1988) for the case when participants respond in a dichotomous fashion 
(yes/no) to a single bid.  Specifically, for the purposes of this study, their procedure is adapted to 
account for the double bidding process and the four resulting outcomes summarized in 
expression 5. In addition, in order to use the additional information contained in the open ended 
responses from farmers’ answering no to both bids, the log-likelihood in (20.5) is modified as 
follows:  
(20.6)    
where h  is the probability density function corresponding to H and WTA is the open ended value 
provided by farmers.  
Estimation of the parameters in equations (20.5) and (20.6) require assuming a specific 
distributional form for H.  The most commonly assumed distributions are the lognormal and the 
normal (e.g., Cameron, 1988).
 The model was estimated under both distributions to test for 14 
 
sensitivity of the results to the distributional assumption. The vector of explanatory variables in 
(20) included the average price of the products sold in the farm, the cost of water use and several 
characteristics of the individual producers and their farm operations (see Table 1). Maximization 
of the log-likelihood functions was performed using MATLAB.  
Results and Discussion    
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Sixty three percent of respondents indicated 
that farming is their main source of income, however, only 37% of farmers actually live in the 
farm. Respondents were 51 years of age on average and 31% had technical or university 
education. To ascertain farmers’ knowledge about the groundwater depletion, we asked whether 
they knew if the water table was dropping. Seventy seven percent of farmers indicated that they 
knew that it was. Eighty two percent of farmers interviewed own the well used for irrigation, 
whereas the remaining 18% percent rent it. The average price per unit of water paid by farmers 
renting the wells is highly variable with an average of JD 0.18/m
3, a standard error of JD 0.04/m
3 
and a maximum value of JD 0.93/m
3. The few cases with very high unit costs (>JD 0.25/m
3), 
were farmers who bear the fixed cost of renting a well but did not use much water to grow crops 
that year. Some variability was observed on the total well rental prices also, likely to be due to 
differences in maximum pumping capacity, demand for water near the well’s location, etc. 
On average farmers pumped about 140,000 m
3 (0.14 Mm
3) per year. Since the sample of 
producers surveyed represents approximately one third of the region’s farmers population, it is 
estimated that more than 42Mm
3 of water are extracted from the aquifer for agricultural use each 
year, which is well above its safe yield estimated at 34Mm
3 (Salameh and Haddadin, 2006). The 
average total cost of pumping water from the aquifer is JD 0.3027/ m
3. This includes energy 
costs (76%), government payments (1%), well maintenance (12%) and well rental expenses 15 
 
(11%).  Regarding the government payments, it should be noticed that after the enactment of 
Jordans’ Groundwater bylaw No. 85 of 2002, farmers extracting more that 0.15 Mm
3 per year are 
supposed to pay a government fee (Venot and Molle, 2008). However, the survey results indicate 
that only 11 out of 40 farmers pumping more than 0.15 Mm
3 of water had pay any government 
fee, which highlights the difficulties in enforcing water regulations in that country (Venot and 
Molle, 2008).  
Summary statistics of the respondents to the double bounded dichotomous choice 
questions are reported in Table 2. Only 20% of the farmers indicated they would sell their water 
property rights at the initial bid price. On the other hand, a combined 60% of farmers answered 
YES to the follow-up questions.  The average bid in the first dichotomous choice question for 
farmers that responded YES was JD 0.16 versus JD 0.13 for those respondents that answered 
NO. Average bid prices in the second choice question were JD 0.03 lower or higher depending 
on farmers’ response to the first bid.  
Table 3 reports the Fm parameter estimates as well as the upper (JD 0.39/m
3) and lower 
(JD 0.15/m
3) bound estimates of the population mean WTA. Interestingly, for the 18% of the 
farmers who rented wells, the average lease charge was JD 0.18 per m
3 of water yield, which 
means that most well owners (82%) value the water they pump for agricultural use at more than 
JD 0.18 per m
3 of water. Therefore, the average lease charge of JD 0.18 per m
3 could be 
considered a reasonable lower-end estimate of the intrinsic value of water in this region. Note 
that this figure is very close to the model’s lower-bound estimate of JD 0.15/m
3. The mid-range 
WTA of JD 0.275/m
3 seems generally realistic since other survey data indicates that the average 
agricultural sale revenues for all 105 farmers in the survey are JD 0.96/m
3 and the average cost 
of pumping water stands at JD 0.27/m
3. Therefore, the remaining JD 0.69 /m
3 of revenue would 16 
 
have to cover all other variable costs and pay for the profits generated as a result of having 
access to the water for agricultural production. In the case of well renters, on average, those 
profits are reduced by JD 0.18/ m
3. 
Unique estimates of the population mean WTA can only be obtained by assuming a 
specific probability distribution for WTA. However, lower and upper bounds can be established 
on the basis of the non-parametric model without having to make such assumption (Figure1).  
The “water prices” in the vertical axis are the farmers’ estimated WTA values. Hence, the supply 
curve indicates the total amount of water that could be purchased from farmers at different water 
prices and can be used to predict the amount of funding required to purchase various water 
quantities. Interestingly, the predictions are very precise (i.e. the lower and upper bounds are 
very close to each other) up to a total supply of 29 Mm
3, and the model suggests that this amount 
could be periodically purchased at an annual price of approximately JD 0.23/m
3, or a total cost of 
about JD 6.8 million per year. For a permanent buyout, at a real discount rate of 5%, these 
amount to present values of JD 4.6/m
3 and JD 136 million over an infinite time horizon.  
This total amount could be lower if the government was able to price discriminate by, for 
example, seeking long-term buyout contracts at increasing unit prices over time. Specifically, the 
estimated supply curve suggests that 14 Mm
3 could be auction-purchased during the first year at 
an annual price of about 0.10 JD/m
3 (permanent purchase price of JD 2.0/m
3, permanent 
purchase cost of JD 28 million). Another 8 Mm
3 could be secured in the future at an average 
annual price of JD 0.17/m
3 (permanent price of JD 3.4/m
3, cost of JD 27.2 million). Purchasing 
an additional 7 Mm
3 is estimated to cost approximately JD 0.23/m
3 (permanent price of JD 
4.6/m
3, cost of JD 32.2 million). 17 
 
In short, price discrimination over time could save the government about JD 49 million 
while fairly compensating the farmers for what the water is worth to them. Purchasing water in 
excess of 29 Mm
3 per year might prove substantially more expensive. This significant uptick in 
the supply curve at approximately 2/3
rd of total annual extraction coincides with the fact that, 
according to the survey, about 30% of the water is used by farmers with gross sale revenues in 
excess of JD 1.0/m
3, and 12.5% is applied by producers with revenues of over JD 2.0/m
3. Likely, 
water is much more valuable to them than for the remaining farmers whose sale revenues only 
average JD 0.40 /m
3. 
Another advantage of price discrimination is that the farmers for whom the water has 
more value would not sell it at the lower offer prices, and these are likely the ones who produce 
the most economic impact in the region. Specifically, the 20% of the farmers with sales revenues 
in excess of JD 2.0/m
3 apply 12.5% of the water but generate 48% of the revenue, and the 39% 
of the producers with revenues of over JD 1.0/m
3 use 30% of the water but generate nearly 75% 
of the total revenues from the sale of agricultural products in the Mafraq-Azraq region. Thus, the 
government can use price discrimination to buy-out about 2/3
rd of the water freeing up an annual 
supply of 29 Mm
3 at a total permanent cost of JD 87.7 million and without substantially 
depressing the overall agricultural and rural economy of the area. 
To finalize, it is important to discuss some of the differences and commonalities for the 
application and interpretation of nonparametric procedures for the estimation of WTA and WTP 
models. Even though in this paper we only present WTA models, the procedures outlined here 
can be used for nonparametric estimation of both the E(WTP) and/or the entire demand curve 
using contingent valuation survey data. In addition, if the maximum WTP or WTA are assumed to 
be infinity, then one of the bounds of the estimates in each model will be unbounded: the upper 18 
 
bound of the WTA estimates and the lower bound of the WTP estimates. Hence, in the case of 
WTP models the nonparametric procedure will always allow to recover bounded conservative 
estimates of both the mean value and demand curves. However, bounded conservative estimates 
of the mean WTA value and the entire supply curve can only be obtained if an estimate of the 
maximum WTA value is available. In our specific application, the maximum WTA was obtained 
from the open-ended responses voluntarily provided by those farmers that answer “no” to the 
two bids offered. 
WTA Regression Analysis  
The WTA regression model results are shown in Table 4
2. Model I is estimated on the 
basis of the responses to the discrete choice variable questions only (equation 23.5), whereas 
Model II also incorporates the information contained in the open-ended WTA value provided by 
farmers who answered NO to both bids (equation 23.6). Restricted versions of Models I and II 
including only an intercept were also estimated in order to obtain and compare the estimates of 
the unconditional mean and standard deviation of the distribution of WTA values (Cameron, 
1988). Interestingly, the WTA mean and error variance estimates using Model II 
 are higher than those obtained using Model I  However, note 
that the mean WTA estimate from Model II is within only 1.4 of its standard error away from the 
mean estimate from Model I, i.e. the two estimates are statistically consistent with each other. 
The different error term variance estimates are explained by the fact that the dependent variable 
in Model II includes the open-ended responses, which means that the random components of the 
two models are not directly comparable (i.e., they are not nested).  
                                                           
2 The models presented in Table 4 assume a normal distribution. There is little difference in the results when a 
lognormal distribution is assumed, which suggests that they are robust with respect to the distributional assumption.   
 19 
 
Specifications of Models I and II including additional explanatory variables (Table 1) 
were initially estimated. However, since the corresponding parameter estimates were not 
significant from a statistical or an economic perspective, and given the small sample size and 
high levels of multicollinearity, some variables were excluded from the final models. Parameter 
values in the conditional mean of Model II are higher than those in Model I (in absolute terms). 
Moreover, Model II yielded a higher number of statistically significant parameter estimates. This 
result suggests that the use of the additional open ended question improves the efficiency of the 
parameter estimates.  
The parameter estimates shown in table 4 measure the marginal effects of a one unit 
increase in the explanatory variable on the WTA. The signs of the parameter estimates 
corresponding to the variables in the final models are generally consistent across the two model 
specifications. In both models, water extraction costs and farmer’s knowledge about the aquifer’s 
ongoing depletion are found to have a negative effect on WTA whereas farmer’s age and well 
ownership have a positive effect on WTA values. The sign of the price parameter is positive in 
Model II and negative but not significant in Model I. 
Each additional year of age increases the farmer’s predicted WTA value by JD 0.001/m
3 
according to Model 1 and by JD 0.003/m
3 in Model 2. Thus, the models suggest that a 60 year 
old producer would have to be paid about JD 0.06/m
3 more than a 30 year old farmer (ceteris 
paribus), which is substantial in comparison to a mean WTA of between JD 0.159/m
3 (Model I) 
and JD 0.191/m
3 (Model II). This result might be due to the fact that older farmers, in general, 
could have a more difficult time finding an alternative income-generating occupation while 
younger producers can reap the benefits of both government payments for giving up their annual 
water supply and the income generated from another job. Also, psychologically, it might be more 20 
 
difficult for an older farmer to give up his water and agricultural lifestyle. The policy implication 
of this finding is that the government would likely have more success on getting younger 
producers to lease their water “rights” at possibly lower prices. 
A JD 1.0/m
3 increase in water extraction costs is predicted to reduce an individual’s WTA 
value by JD 0.029/m
3 in Model I and JD 0.044/m
3 in Model II. On the other hand, a JD 1.0/m
3 
increase in the average price of agricultural products is predicted to increase and individual’s 
WTA value by JD 0.141/ m
3  in Model II (the parameter is not significant in Model I). Although 
the direction of these effects is consistent with expectations based on the theoretical model, their 
magnitudes are relatively modest. In fact, these marginal effects translate into elasticity values of 
about 0.19 for the price variable and 0.08 for the cost variable. This might be partially explained 
by the fact that producers are being asked to forgive uncertain future revenues with a fixed but 
certain payment amount. Moreover, both the price and costs used in the estimation correspond to 
a specific year and it is unknown how these values compare to their long term averages.  
The marginal effects of the dummy explanatory variables are interpreted relative to the 
dummy variables not included in the model (a farmer who does not know that the water table is 
dropping and that rents a well). Farmers who own a well are willing to accept JD0.026/m
3 and 
JD0.062/m
3 more than farmers that rent a well according to Models I and II, respectively. On the 
other hand, farmers who know that the water table is dropping are willing to accept JD0.021/m
3 
and JD0.073/m
3 less than farmers that are not aware of the aquifer’s depletion according to 
Models I and II, respectively. The effect of farmers’ knowledge about the groundwater resource 
depletion on farmers’ willingness to sell their water rights has immediate policy implications for 
water use in Jordan and also illustrates the effect of information on market outcomes. For 21 
 
example, informing farmers about the aquifer depletion will decrease their WTA and also 
decrease the costs of buying their water use rights.  
Finally, regarding the variance specification of Model II, it is found that producers with 
higher application costs and farmers that know that the water table is dropping display more 
homogenous preferences.  
Summary and Conclusions  
This study has utilized data from a survey of farmers in the Mafraq-Azraq basin to examine the 
economic feasibility of water transfers from irrigation to urban water use. Farmers’ responses to 
discrete contingent valuation questions were used to estimate the aggregate costs of buying their 
water use rights and also to identify factors affecting their willingness to accept values to sell 
their water use rights.  
The theoretical models indicate that farmers’ WTA for the water use rights is influenced 
by the same factors that influence farm profitability: output and input prices and other factors 
affecting both the production and the utility functions.  
The econometric and modeling innovation is the utilization of contingent valuation and 
nonparametric procedures to estimate WTA models. We show that the estimation of the mean 
WTA and supply curves using nonparametric procedures require an estimate of the maximum 
WTA value. It is open to debate if researchers interested in using nonparametric procedures for 
WTA model estimation should always include an open ended follow-up question for individuals 
that answer no to both bids.
3 As mentioned previously, one of the reasons given for the adoption 
of referendum type CV elicitation formats (included discrete choice mechanisms) instead of 
open-ended formats was that the open-ended model invites strategic overstatement of both WTP 
                                                           
3 In the case of the single bounded discrete choice elicitation method this would correspond to a second open-ended 
follow up question for those individuals that answer “no” to the first bid.  22 
 
and WTA (Arrow et al., 1993). This means that the use of the extra open-ended question could 
result in an overstated maximum WTA value which is not necessarily a bad thing if what is 
required is a conservative estimate. This shortcoming of the nonparametric procedure should be 
weighed against the advantages of using a distribution free procedure. As shown in Haab and 
McConnell (1997) expected WTP (and hence expected WTA and the corresponding demand and 
supply curves) are highly dependent on the shape of the distribution assumed when parametric 
models are used.  
Regarding our empirical application, supply curve estimates indicate the total amount of 
water that could be purchased from farmers at different water prices levels and can be used by 
the Jordan government to assess the potential costs and benefits of transferring water from the 
agricultural sector to others sectors of the economy. For example, it is estimated that water 
shadow price in Amman could reach values as high as JD47/m
3 by 2020 which is significantly 
above the JD1.81/ m
3 maximum WTA estimate from our models (Salman et al., 2006).   
Water extraction costs and farmers’ knowledge about the aquifer depletion were found to 
have a negative effect on WTA values whereas than the price of the agricultural products, 
farmers’ age and well ownership have a positive effect on WTA values. The effect of farmers’ 
knowledge about the groundwater resource depletion on farmers’ willingness to sell their water 
rights has immediate policy implications for water use in Jordan and also illustrates the effect of 
information on market outcomes. Informing farmers about the aquifer depletion will decrease 
their WTA and also decrease the costs of buying their water use rights. Moreover, this result 
implies that informing farmers’ knowledge about the resource depletion will shift the supply out, 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables of the Sample of Jordanian Farmers 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
error 
Max  Min 
Farming is Main Income 
Source (Yes=1, No=0) 
0.625  0.487  1.000  0.000 
Farmer Owns Well              
(Yes=1, No=0) 
0.817  0.388  1.000  0.000 
Farmer Lives on Farm          
(Yes=1, No=0) 
0.365  0.484  1.000  0.000 
Farmers’ Age (years)   50.644  13.221  75.000  22.000 
University or Technical 
Education (Yes=1, No=0)  
0.308  0.464  1.000  0.000 
Farmers Knows Water Table 
is Dropping (Yes=1, No=0) 
0.769  0.423  1.000  0.000 
Total Water Use (Mm
3)  0.142  0.072  0.454  0.010 
Total Area Farmed (100 
donums)
a  
2.535  1.837  8.200  0.300 




0.227  0.399  3.000  0.009 
Government Payments for 
Water Extraction (JD/m
3) 
0.002  0.006  0.038  0.000 
Well Maintenance Costs    
(JD/m
3) 
0.037  0.042  0.214  0.000 




0.178  0.037  0.929  0.000 
Total Cost of Water 
Application (JD/ m
3) 
0.299  0.476  3.429  0.019 
Average Price Received for 
Agricultural Products (1000 
JD/T) 
0.229  0.241  1.600  0.015 
Number of farmers (n)  105 
a 1 donum = 0.10 Hectares 
  b 1 JD = 0.70 U.S. dollars 
  c Based on the sample of 19 farmers that rent wells.  




Table 2. Responses to Double Bounded Dichotomous Questions (n=105) 
 
First Discrete Choice Question  Yes  No 
Percentage of respondents (%)  20.00  80.00 
Average Price (JD/m
3)
a     0.16    0.13 
Second  Discrete Choice Question   Yes  No  Yes  No 
Percentage of respondents (%)  12.40  7.60  47.60  32.40 
Average Price (JD/m
3)  0.13  0.13  0.16  0.16 
         





























b  Turnbull CDF 
0-0.033  0.029 (0.021)
c 
0.033-0.067  0.029 (0.021) 
0.067-0.100  0.275 (0.049) 
0.100-0.133  0.334 (0.052) 
0.133-0.167  0.511 (0.056) 
0.167-0.200  0.589 (0.060) 
0.200 -0.233   0.863 (0.046) 
0.233 +   1.0 
Lower bound population mean WTA (JD/m
3)  0.146 (0.007) 
Upper bound population mean WTA (JD/m
3)  0.391 (0.114) 
Log-likelihood function  -121.92 
a Only 85 observations were used to estimate the distribution function since 
farmers renting the well were excluded from the sample 
 
b1 JD = 0.70 U.S. dollars 
c Standard errors reported in parentheses are standard errors obtained using 
bootstrapping 
 
      
         
















Table 4. Estimation Results of the Willingness to Accept Model for Water Use Rights in Jordan 
 
Variable  
     
Model I
   Model II
a  
  Restricted   Unrestricted   Restricted  Unrestricted  
Mean          








Average Price Received for 
Agricultural Products (1000 JD/T) 
  -0.009 
(0.034) 
  0.141** 
(0.068) 
Total Cost of Water Application 
(JD/ m
3) 
  -0.029* 
(0.189) 
  -0.044*** 
(0.008) 
Farmer Knows Water Table is 
Dropping (Yes=1, No=0) 
  -0.021 
(0.018) 
  -0.071* 
(0.056) 
Farmer’s Age  
(years) 
  0.001 
(0.001) 
  0.003*** 
(0.045) 
Well Ownership                
(Yes=1, No=0) 
  0.025 
(0.021) 
  0.062* 
(0.045) 
Standard deviation (σ)         








Total Cost of Water Application 
(JD/ m
3) 
      -3.044*** 
(0.795) 
Farmer Knows Water Table is 
Dropping (Yes=1, No=0) 
      -0.733** 
(0.407) 
Log-likelihood  -161.78  -158.23  -230.91  -219.49 
Sample size  104  104 
a Heteroskedasticity in Unrestricted Model II was modeled using the multiplicative form   where   is 
the vector of explanatory variables and   is a parameter vector.  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic standard errors.  One asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 10% 

















Figure 1. Estimated Water Supply Curve  
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